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Redistricting Commissions  
in the Western United States 
Peter Miller and Bernard Grofman* 
Congressional and state-level redistricting in the United States is 
predominately done by state legislatures, usually subject to a gubernatorial 
veto. However, some states—especially in the West—use a commission to 
draw new congressional or legislative districts. These redistricting 
commissions, which take a variety of institutional forms, are guided by 
redistricting criteria that they are mandated to follow. We identify the 
institutional arrangements used in the western states during the 2011–
2012 redistricting cycles and briefly consider the nature of public input in 
these states across types of redistricting processes, and we indicate whether 
or not the state was able reach a timely agreement on a congressional plan 
that was not subsequently overturned in court. We then compare 
congressional districts in the western states drawn by state legislatures, 
commissions, and the courts from 1992 to 2012, with a focus on three 
criteria: the integrity of political subdivisions, the compactness of the 
districts, and the competitiveness of the districts. We find only very limited 
evidence that commissions, on balance, are better able than legislatures to 
produce compact, competitive districts that respect the boundaries of 
counties and places in the states, and we find considerable variance across 
states and across types of commissions in the degree to which good 
government criteria are satisfied. 
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Over the past several decades, reformers have sought to take districting out 
of the hands of the legislature so as to avoid the kinds of problems commonly 
associated with legislatively drawn plans, such as partisan gerrymanders, 
incumbency protection plans, and oddly configured districts that fail to respect 
standard districting principles.1 In this Article, we will focus on congressional 
districting in the western states.2 Seven western states now give primary authority 
for congressional line drawing to a commission: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, and Washington. The combination of population 
growth, direct democracy, and experimentation with redistricting commissions 
distinguish the West from other regions.3 First, western states tend to be 
geographically large, but with small state legislatures. Second, eleven of the twenty-
two states that provide for direct democracy (in the form of the initiative or 
referendum),4 and eight of the thirteen states that use redistricting commissions to 
redraw district lines for either Congress or the state legislature, are in the West.5 
 
1. Jeffrey Kubin, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 841–44, 852–55 
(1996). 
2. Legislative redistricting is beyond the scope of this Article. 
3. See generally MICAH ALTMAN ET AL., REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 
WEST (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011) (describing and comparing the redistricting processes of western 
states). 
4. See State I&R, IRI INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. U.S. CAL., http://www.iandrinstitute 
.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
5. See State I&R, supra note 4; Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/redist/2009-redistricting-commissions 
-Table.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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Third, this region of the country has experienced dramatic population growth; 
only Montana (following the 1990 reapportionment) has lost representation since 
the redistricting revolution of the 1960s. In the 2010 reapportionment cycle, four 
of the eight states that gained a seat were in the West.6 As Justin Levitt has noted, 
“redistricting in the West has a complexion largely different from that in the rest 
of the nation . . . .”7 
The characteristics of the redistricting commissions in the West vary across 
the region. We identify three types of redistricting commissions in the West, and 
consider how specific features of the commission (e.g., the size, appointment 
procedure, and voting rule) can influence the redistricting process itself. We will 
compare congressional districting processes and outcomes in Arizona, California, 
Idaho, and Washington to those in five other western states where legislatures 
have primary authority to draw district maps: Colorado,8 Oregon, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and Utah.9 Alaska, Montana,10 and Wyoming have only one at-large 
representative and so are excluded from our analyses. There are several questions 
we will investigate. 
First, how well do commissions function? Do these commissions speedily 
reach consensus on membership, limit the degree of internal dissent, and produce 
a plan that satisfies constitutionally and statutorily mandated criteria (e.g., 
population equality and respect for the Voting Rights Act requirements)? 
Second, what is the role of public input in the commission as opposed to the 
noncommission states? In particular, do the commissions act more vigorously to 
solicit input from the public? 
Third, how do commission-drawn plans compare with legislative- and court-
drawn plans? We examine district maps and electoral data from 1992 to 2012 to 
measure to what extent commissions (1) respect boundaries of political 
subdivisions, such as counties and places; (2) produce compact districts; and (3) 
draw competitive districts. 
We begin with a brief overview of the redistricting process. 
 
6. See infra Table 7. 
7. Justin Levitt, Redistricting and the West: The Legal Context, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND 
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST, supra note 3, at 15, 32–33. 
8. In Colorado, while the state legislature is charged with congressional redistricting, legislative 
redistricting is done by a commission. Id. at 18. 
9. We limit our consideration to states identified by the Census Bureau as in either the 
Mountain West or Pacific West divisions of the United States. As a consequence, we—in the main—
do not address redistricting in other states outside this region. We also limit our discussion of the 
Hawaii commission, as we were unable to attend any of the public comment hearings in Hawaii or 
review transcripts of those hearings. 
10. The redistricting commission in Montana is also used to redraw legislative districts. Levitt, 
supra note 7, at 33. 
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I. REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
In U.S. elections, as in virtually all elections in democracies, constituencies 
are geographically defined and normally consist of contiguous territory. However, 
in the United States, unlike in virtually every other democratic country in the 
world,11 redistricting—the decennial redrawing of constituency boundaries for 
city, county, state, and national legislatures—is largely done directly by the 
politicians who will be seeking reelection rather than by neutral administrative 
bodies. In the United States, it has been not so jokingly said that it is the legislators 
choosing their voters at least as much as it is the voters choosing their 
representatives. 
Sometimes a plan will reflect an attempt by the dominant party to enjoy 
partisan advantage by diminishing the value of the votes of supporters of the 
other party by “packing” those supporters into a handful of districts that are won 
overwhelmingly by candidates of that party or by fragmenting the opposition vote 
so that the dominant party may be able to win a seat by a relatively bare margin;12 
but a plan may also reflect a “sweetheart deal,” a so-called “bipartisan 
gerrymander” in which the existing balance of party seat share in the legislature (or 
in a state’s congressional delegation) is “glued” into place by creating districts that 
are “safe” for the incumbents of both parties. Such an outcome is especially likely 
if there is not unified control of both chambers of the legislature and of the 
governorship.13 A special case of such a sweetheart deal is when each of the two 
chambers of a legislature are controlled by a different party, and a deal is cut 
between the chambers that allows each branch to draw its own map.14 However, 
where the two branches of the legislature are controlled by a different party from 
 
11. LISA HANDLEY & BERNARD GROFMAN, REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 60 (2008); see also David Butler & Bruce Cain, Reapportionment: A Study in Comparative 
Government, 4 ELECTORAL STUD. 197, 200 (1985). 
12. Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 6 (1988). 
13. Sweetheart deals can also result from situations in which one party is dominant. In such 
situations, rather than seek to increase its seat share, with the potential cost of weakening the 
reelection chances of some incumbents of its own party, the dominant party offers both the 
incumbents of the other party and its own incumbents a safe seat, or something very close to it. 
Consider, for example, the 2002 map in California, where “[t]he smallest margin of victory for any 
California incumbent was 18 percentage points, and the average incumbent received a 68 percent vote 
share” Richard Forgette and Glenn Platt, Redistricting Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S. 
Congress, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY 942 (2005). 
14. New York is often a paradigmatic case of this phenomenon, due to the long-standing 
Democratic dominance of the state assembly—a result of the population dominance of New York 
City in the state—and Republican control of the state senate—a product of complex reapportionment 
procedures established in the 1894 state constitution. See N.Y. CONST. art. 3, §§ 4, 5. In their 
discussion of the 1950s and 1960s redistricting cycles in New York state, with reference to the state 
assembly and senate apportionment formulae, Gust Tyler and David Wells observe, “Republican 
control [is] built into the very constitution of the state. Gov. Alfred E. Smith used to refer to the New 
York Legislature as ‘constitutionally Republican.’” Gus Tyler & David Wells, New York: Constitutionally 
Republican, in THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT 221, 221 (Malcolm Jewell ed., 1962). 
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that of the governor, another common outcome in the states where a 
gubernatorial veto applies to redistricting legislation is a stalemate, which puts 
redistricting into the hands of federal (or sometimes, state) courts.15 
By carefully drawing boundaries to ensure particular concentrations of voters 
of a given type, such as strong Democrats or strong Republicans, or members of a 
given racial or ethnic minority, those drawing a plan can ensure that outcomes at 
the district level can be largely anticipated well in advance of any actual election. 
And since those who draw the lines will be the same people who either wish to 
run as an incumbent in a redrawn new district, or who think they might run in one 
of the districts in the future (for the upper chamber in the legislature, or for the 
U.S. House) when the present incumbent retires or dies, there is a strong tendency 
for plans to be drawn so as to minimize future political competition. Indeed, 
regardless of whether we are looking at a partisan gerrymander or a bipartisan 
gerrymander, the vast majority of districts drawn in legislature-drawn maps will be 
safe for one party or the other.16 The absence of partisan turnover in more than 
three-fourths of the districts over the course of an entire redistricting decade has 
been one of the hallmarks of elections to the U.S. House; and similar, sometimes 
even more extreme, patterns are found in many state legislatures.17 
Thus, the consequences of allowing legislators to draw their own lines often 
have been (1) plans with most districts safe for candidates of a given party, thus 
partly insulating legislators from the need to be responsive to public sentiments; 
and (2) boundary lines that are drawn to the convenience of politicians, which 
satisfy equal-population constraints and are sensitive to minority-vote dilution 
voting rights issues, but still violate other good-government criteria for districting, 
such as geographic compactness and respect for municipal and county 
 
15. Courts play a role in U.S. redistricting that is unlike that in any other country. See 
HANDLEY & GROFMAN, supra note 11, at 61. In particular, one person, one vote considerations, 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (which applies to jurisdictions within sixteen states, either in the 
state as a whole or in some part of the state), and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which applies to 
all jurisdictions, operate to set severe critical constraints on line drawing. See Levitt, supra note 7, at 
21–23. Court challenges based on these or other issues face the vast majority of redistricting plans for 
state legislatures or the House of Representatives. In general, a three-judge panel consisting of two 
district judges and one circuit court judge has original jurisdiction for challenges to congressional or 
legislative district maps, while the Supreme Court holds appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 
(2012). In Idaho, for instance, there is an automatic review by the state supreme court of the maps 
drawn by that state’s redistricting commission to ensure compliance with redistricting criteria 
mandated at either the federal or the state level. See Mathew May & Gary Moncrief, Reapportionment 
and Redistricting in the West, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST, supra note 3, 
at 39, 49. Relatedly, the Washington State Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear redistricting 
litigation. See 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws 244 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.130 
(2012)). In other states, courts may be involved in drawing lines when the state (or a redistricting 
commission) has failed to reach agreement. See Michael McDonald, A Comparative Analysis of 
Redistricting Institutions in the United States, 2001–02, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 371, 377 (2004). 
16. Owen & Grofman, supra note 12, at 14. 
17. Todd Makse, Strategic Constituency Manipulation in State Legislative Redistricting, 37 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 225, 240 (2012). 
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boundaries,18 and which are often downright ugly. When it comes to drawing new 
lines, the set of sitting legislators have a strong bias in favor of plans that will 
make their own reelection more likely, and the majority party in the legislature has 
a strong bias in favor of maintaining or strengthening its own position. Thus, we 
expect there to be various heavy thumbs on the scales when it comes to weighing 
considerations of good governance against instincts of self-preservation and 
partisan gain if we allow the legislature (in conjunction with a governor acting out 
of partisan motives) to decide on new boundary plans. 
Concern for these problems has led to three types of proposals for change. 
First and foremost, there have been repeated attempts by reformers in some states 
to take redistricting out of the hands of the elected officeholders and create 
commissions (bipartisan, or a mix of partisan and nonpartisan appointees) to draw 
the lines.19 Such attempts have been most successful in the twenty-two states that 
allow their constitutions to be amended by a voter-sponsored initiative. Two of 
the four western states we investigate (Arizona and California) have commissions 
that were put in place via citizen initiative. Supporters of California Proposition 20 
(which expanded the remit of the redistricting commission to include 
congressional districts) claimed that passage of the proposition would “[put] an 
end to backroom deals by ensuring redistricting is completely open to the public 
and transparent. Proposition 20 means no secret meetings or payments are 
allowed and politicians can't divide communities just to get the political outcome 
they want.”20 Likewise, those in Arizona advocating for passage of Proposition 
106 in 2000 argued, in part, that passage of the proposition would allow citizens 
“to have a voice in drawing the boundaries for your legislative and congressional 
districts. Through open meetings throughout the State—not backroom dealing— 
we will have a process run by the public.”21 Other advocates in Arizona 
mentioned that a commission would create more competitive districts, and 
prevent cities from being split into multiple districts. 
 
18. Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Redistricting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 
122 (1985). 
19. See generally McDonald, supra note 15 (identifying and discussing the institutional rules for 
redistricting and identification of the then-twelve states where districting for one or more chambers 
of the state legislature or for the U.S. House of Representatives is not done directly by legislators 
and/or the governor). In most of these states, there are commissions charged with line drawing. 
Although California has been added to the list of commission states since McDonald’s article, it is still 
the case that most commissions have members selected in a partisan fashion (e.g., by state legislative 
leaders and/or the governor) and others (perhaps only a tiebreaker) who are intended to be 
nonpartisan, usually selected from voters registered as independent and/or chosen by a super-
majoritarian consensus procedure within the commission. For a discussion of procedures in the 
western states, see infra pp. 652–54. 
20. Proposition 20: Voter Information Guide, CAL. SEC’Y STATE, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/ 
past/2010/general/propositions/20/arguments-rebuttals.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
21. Proposition 106, AZ. SEC’Y STATE, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/ 
pubpamphlet/english/prop106.htm#pgfId-1 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (quoting Arizona Attorney 
General Janet Napolitano’s statements in support of Proposition 106). 
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The Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Washington commissions were created 
through referendum.22 The Hawaii commission was created in the course of the 
1968 State Constitutional Convention, which was inspired in part by a 1965 U.S. 
district court order invalidating the state senate apportionment scheme as a 
violation of equal protection.23 
A second reform proposal has been to impose very specific criteria on 
redistricting in such a fashion as to attempt to constrain the process and prevent at 
least the more egregious forms of partisan or incumbent protection 
gerrymanders.24 Most western states where the legislature is responsible for 
redistricting impose few requirements on the drawing of districts. At the extreme, 
Nevada has no formal requirements for drawing districts above and beyond the 
federal laws (i.e., population equality and compliance with section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act).25 
States using a commission to draw districts tend, in contrast, to have 
relatively elaborate criteria for the redistricting authorities to follow. For example, 
in Arizona the establishing legislation for the commission requires it to be 
attentive to geographic features and local government boundaries and respect 
communities of interest, and requires that politically competitive districts be 
drawn to the extent that doing so is compatible with achievement of the other 
criteria.26 Moreover, incumbents’ and candidates’ residences are not to be 
considered. The California commission’s mandate also includes explicit 
redistricting criteria, including drawing compact, contiguous districts, preserving 
communities of interest, and not considering political data or incumbents’ 
 
22. Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Redistricting, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND 
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST, supra note 3, at 111, 119–20. California voters, after having rejected 
four different redistricting initiatives over the course of several decades, passed a ballot initiative in 
2008 that created a commission to draw state legislative districts and then, in 2010, expanded the 
remit of the California commission to include congressional line drawing. See Vladimir Kogan & Thad 
Kousser, Great Expectations and the California Redistricting Commission, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND 
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST, supra note 3, at 219, 223–24. 
23. 2 CRAIG KUGIASKI, LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, HAWAII CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION STUDIES, ARTICLE III: REAPPORTIONMENT IN HAWAII 37 (1978); see also Norman 
Meller & Harold S. Roberts, Hawaii, in IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT ON THE THIRTEEN 
WESTERN STATES 113, 113–35 (Eleanore Bushnell ed., 1970). 
24. The passage in 2010 of Amendment 6 to the Florida State Constitution established 
additional criteria to the congressional redistricting process, including drawing compact, contiguous 
districts, with equal population, that respect existing political and geographic boundaries, and do not 
favor or disfavor any political party, or diminish the opportunity for racial or language minorities to 
elect representatives of their choice. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20. 
25. State statutes in Oregon, as an example of a legislative-drawn map with strict criteria, 
require the legislature to draw districts that are contiguous, of equal population, use existing 
geographic or political boundaries, keep communities of interest together, are connected by roads, do 
not favor a political party or incumbent, and do not dilute the voting strength of language or ethnic 
minority groups. See OR. REV. STAT. §188.010 (2011). 
26. See ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. 2, § 1. 
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addresses.27 The criteria in Washington are similar to those in Arizona and 
California.28 The Idaho commission has similar criteria, with the further 
requirement that pieces of districts be connected by a state or federal highway if 
the district contains more than one county.29 
A third proposal of reformers has been to require more than a simple 
legislative majority to pass redistricting plans.30 Requiring a legislative 
supermajority in each house to pass a plan is based in large part on the notion that 
the parties will be forced to reach agreement on a fair and reasonable plan, since 
few politicians want the uncertainty and potential chaos of having a court-drawn 
plan that would disrupt all the existing districts—and that is what would happen if 
the legislature (and the governor) failed to reach agreement. However, requiring a 
supermajoritarian agreement on a plan is analogous in many ways to the situation 
where there is not unified partisan control of a state. Such situations tend to either 
result in “sweetheart” incumbency protection deals, or in a deadlock that puts 
redistricting decisions into the hands of a court, as was the case in the 1970 and 
1990 redistricting rounds in California. 
The supermajoritarian idea has, however, also been applied to commissions. 
One of the states we examine, California, operates with a supermajoritarian voting 
rule.31 Of course, the price paid for supermajoritarianism is, ceteris paribus, a lower 
likelihood of agreement, because of the need for more actors to agree on a plan in 
order for that plan to pass. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 
The first and most obvious (but still often neglected) point about 
commissions is that there are no nonpartisan commissions in the United States,32 
although there is one example of what we are calling a tripartite commission that 
has sometimes been mistakenly called nonpartisan. Most commissions are 
 
27. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d). 
28. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43. 
29. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1506 (2013). 
30. Professor Bruce Cain, former director of the Institute of Government Studies at UC 
Berkeley, who had been skeptical of taking redistricting out of the hands of the legislature, was the 
most prominent advocate of this idea, but his more recent work has opted for a variant of the New 
Jersey commission “tiebreaker” model, but with explicit instructions to the “independent” 
commissioner as to a sequential process to use to provide strong incentives to the parties to move 
closer to one another in the plans that each proposes. See Bruce Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better 
Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1817 (2012). 
31. The Idaho commission requires a two-thirds majority vote to pass a map. IDAHO CONST. 
art. 3, § 2. However, as the commission has six members, a two-thirds majority and a bare majority 
are mathematically equivalent. 
32. Iowa’s legislative reference bureau does operate in a nonpartisan fashion, but it does not 
have final power to pass a plan; it merely gives advice to the legislature, albeit advice that is normally 
given great weight. See Legislative Guide to Redistricting in Iowa, IOWA LEGISLATURE, https:// 
www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/Central/Guides/redist.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
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bipartisan, but the results of the commission process in some states may look to 
have a partisan cast, although it is relatively well established from academic 
analyses of previous rounds of redistricting that, on average, commission states 
have lower partisan bias (and greater average responsiveness to changes in voter 
preferences) than do states where the legislature is the primary instrument of line 
drawing.33 
A. Bipartisan Commission Variants 
We may subdivide bipartisan commissions into four types, distinguished by 
the use of a neutral chair, the partisan balance of the commission, the voting rule 
to pass the map, and the appointment procedure used to name commissioners. 
We summarize the main features of redistricting commissions in the western states 
in Tables 1a through 1c. 
 


















Alaska** 1998 1 () 60 20 
Arizona* 2000 9 (+1) 67 70 
California 2010 53 () 34 38 
Colorado** 1974 7 () 42 40 
Hawaii 1968 2 () 16 4 
Idaho* 1994 2 () 81 79 
Montana** 1972 1 () 68 56 
Washington* 1983 10 (+1) 43 45 
Notes: * The Arizona, Idaho, and Washington state house is composed of districts that each elects 
two representatives. ** The Colorado commission only redraws legislative districts. Montana and 




33. Jamie Carson & Michael Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral 
Competition in United States House of Representatives Races, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 455, 458 (2004). 
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Table 1b: Characteristics of Redistricting Commissions in the Western States 
 




Party Affiliation of 
Commissioners 
Alaska** Republican 5 Appointments are made 
without regard to political 
affiliation 
Arizona* Republican 5 2 Democratic, 2 
Republican, 1 unaffiliated 
chair 
California Democrat 14 5 Democratic, 5 
Republican, 4 unaffiliated 
Colorado** Democrat 11 5 Democratic, 5 
Republican, 1 unaffiliated 
Hawaii Democrat 9 4 Democratic, 4 
Republican, 1 unaffiliated 
chair 
Idaho* Republican 6 3 Democratic, 3 
Republican 
Montana** Democrat 5 2 Democratic, 2 
Republican, 1 unaffiliated 
chair 
Washington* Democrat 5 2 Democratic, 2 
Republican, 1 unaffiliated 
chair† 
Notes: * The Arizona, Idaho, and Washington state House is composed of districts that each 
elects two representatives. ** The Colorado commission only redraws legislative districts. 
Montana and Alaska elect one at-large representative. † The chair of the Washington 
commission is a nonvoting member of the commission. 
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Table 1c: Characteristics of Redistricting Commissions in the Western States 
 
State Selection Process 
for Commissioners 
Voting Rule for 
Passage 
Subject to Section 5 
of the Voting 
Rights Act? 
Alaska** Appointment by 
governor, legislative 
leadership, and chief 
justice 
Majority Yes 
Arizona* Appointment by 
legislative leadership, 





and random draw 
Supermajority, with 
majority of each 
partisan bloc 
Yes, for four 
counties 
Colorado** Appointed by 
governor, legislative 
leadership and chief 
justice 
Majority No 
Hawaii Appointed by 
legislative leadership, 
chair selected by state 
supreme court 
Majority No 
Idaho* Appointment by 
legislative and party 
leadership 
Supermajority No 
Montana** Appointment by 
legislative leadership, 
chair selection by 
commission 
Majority No 
Washington* Appointment by 
legislative leadership, 
chair selected by 
commission 
Majority No 
Notes: * The Arizona, Idaho, and Washington state house is composed of districts that each 
elects two representatives. ** The Colorado commission only redraws legislative districts. 
Montana and Alaska elect one at-large representative. 
 
  
648 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:637 
 
The first type of redistricting commissions is what we will call, following 
common usage, a “tiebreaker” process. Here all but one member of the 
commission is chosen through partisan mechanisms that are intended to equalize 
the number of members chosen by representatives of the two leading parties in 
the state. The remaining members of the commission are chosen by majority 
agreement among the already appointed partisans, which would require at least 
one member of the opposite party to join a coalition with the other party’s 
members.34 Usually, this tiebreaker becomes the chair of the commission. The 
commissions in Arizona, Montana, and Colorado fall into this category. While it is 
possible, in theory, for an agreement to be reached in commissions of this type 
that did not include the tiebreaker, in practice this never occurs, and usually the 
tiebreaker ends up in agreement with a plan proposed by just one of the two 
parties. The decisions of such commissions may generate partisan rancor 
comparable to what we see from states where one party entirely controls the 
redistricting process and engages in a partisan gerrymander.35 
A second, closely related form of bipartisanship results when the 
commission membership is exactly evenly split between the parties in terms of 
appointing power, and a majority of members is needed to pass a plan. This form 
of bipartisanship, agreement across party lines, is found in the Idaho commission. 
The Washington commission is a variation on this type of commission, even 
though it has an odd number of members, because the chair of the Washington 
commission (who may not be a member of a major political party) is a nonvoting 
member of the commission.36 
The third type of bipartisan process can have either an even or an odd 
number of members, but it requires that a supermajority reach agreement before a 
plan be enacted. Inevitably, this supermajority will be such as to require agreement 
that crosses party lines. California’s redistricting scheme is sometimes described in 
the press as nonpartisan, and it is true that is has some nonpartisan elements, such 
 
34. There are various rules in the different commissions about what happens when no 
agreement on a tiebreaker can be reached, but usually the failure of the commission to reach 
agreement on its own membership triggers some form of state-court intervention, either to select a 
tiebreaker or to create a court-drawn plan. 
35. For example, in the 2000 redistricting cycle in Oregon, when the legislature was unable to 
create legislative maps, the duty fell to Democratic Secretary of State Bill Bradbury. See, e.g. Priscilla L. 
Southwell, Controversies in Electoral Redistricting in Oregon, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING 
IN THE WEST, supra note 3, at 199, 207–08. Though, after litigation challenges, these maps were put 
into place with only minimal changes, Republicans claimed Bradbury inflated the share of seats the 
Democrats could win by extending the city of Portland into multiple legislative districts. Id. During 
the hearings in Oregon that one of us attended in 2011, many witnesses registered their discontent 
with the old “Bradbury map.” Similarly, Larry Bartels, New Jersey tiebreaker in the 2000 redistricting 
round, was accused by some Republicans of insuring pro-Democratic legislative plans. See, e.g., 
Barbara Fitzgerald, In Control, but Losing a Grip, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at NJ1; Joseph Gambardello 
et al., GOP Sues Over Legislative Redistricting, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 13, 2001, at B1; Suzette Parmley, 
Nonvoter Held Sway in Redistricting State Districts, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 21, 2001, at B1. 
36. See Washington State Redistricting Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.030 (2013). 
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as the initial role of state auditors in picking members of the commission, the fact 
that public officials are ineligible for membership, and some lottery elements of 
the selection process.37 It also has bipartisan elements, such as the voir dire role 
for leaders of both parties in vetoing potential commission members, and the 
need for agreement that includes a majority of the members of each party.38 
However, the requirement for concurrence of a majority of the 
“independent/decline to state” members of the commission in the final plan 
suggests that it is better characterized as what we might call a tripartite 
commission, though the redistricting process in California is unique.39 
The fourth type of redistricting commission acts as a backup when the state 
legislature is unwilling or unable to create district maps in a timely manner. These 
“partisan commissions,” so-called because they are composed of elected officials, 
virtually guarantees that one party will be able to effectively control outcomes. The 
Indiana redistricting commission, for instance, is composed of the speaker of the 
state house, president pro tempore of the senate, chairwomen of the house and 
senate redistricting committees, and a fifth member of the general assembly 
appointed by the governor.40 The nine-member backup commission in 
Connecticut, by contrast, resembles the Arizona commission in appointment 
procedure.41 Partisan commissions are more often used to create legislative 
districts, as is the case in seven states, including Oregon, and Texas.42 
III. ABILITY TO REACH CONSENSUS IN A TIMELY FASHION 
As noted earlier, in states under divided partisan control, the chances for 
deadlock are high. The courts were called upon to draw congressional maps in 
Colorado (when the legislature failed to pass a map), Nevada (where the 
Republican governor twice vetoed a plan passed by Democrats in the legislature), 
and New Mexico (where the Republican governor vetoed a plan passed by the 
Democrat-controlled legislature). By contrast, the legislatures in Oregon43 and 
 
37. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(1)–(b) (2012). 
38. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(e), (g) (2012). 
39. Issue 2 in Ohio, defeated in the 2012 election, sought to establish a twelve-member 
redistricting commission based on the structure of the California commission. Commissioners in 
Ohio would be drawn equally from the two major parties and unaffiliated voters, that would use a 
simple majority voting rule to produce district maps. See State Issue 2 Rejected by Wide Margin, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 4:48 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/national-govt-
politics/state-Issue-2-plan-to-redraw-boundaries/nSygx. 
40. IND. CODE § 3-3-2-2 (2013). 
41. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b). 
42. The passage of State Question 748 in Oklahoma, in 2010, expanded the size of the backup 
commission used in that state for redistricting in the event the legislature fails to act, and changed the 
membership of the commission from statewide public officials (attorney general, superintendent of 
public instruction, and state treasurer) to appointees of the legislative leadership and the governor. See 
Donovan, supra note 22, at 111, 119–20. 
43. The Oregon state house was split 30–30 and the state senate had a bare Democratic 
majority of one, 16–14. Statistical Summary 76th Legislative Assembly, OR. BLUE BOOK, http://bluebook 
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Utah (under unified Republican control) successfully created district maps without 
court challenges. 
 
Table 2: Days Between Delivery of Census Data and Map Enactment44 
 
State 1992 2002 2012 
Arizona 431 227 313 
California 336 181 160 
Colorado 384 312 285 
Hawaii 152 256 214 
Idaho 328 152 221 
Nevada 133 94 245 
New Mexico 213 285 289 
Oregon 307 219 127 
Utah 248 204 238 
Washington 301 285 343 
Notes: Bold type indicates commission-drawn maps. Italic type indicates court-
drawn maps. Plain text indicates maps drawn by the state legislature.
 
Table 2 lists the days elapsed between the delivery of the census data 
necessary to begin the redistricting process, and the date a final congressional map 
is enacted for the three redistricting cycles in 1991, 2001, and 2011.45 The 1990s 
round of redistricting was exceptionally long, the average western state took 289 
 
.state.or.us/state/legis/legis18.htm (last visited July 3, 2013). The congressional map passed in 2011 
was the first time since 1911 that the legislature was able to pass a district map without involvement 
from the courts. Lines that Don’t Divide: A City Club of Portland Report on Improving Oregon’s Redistricting 
Process, CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND BULL. (City Club of Portland, Portland, Or.), Feb. 2012, at 4. 
44. Census delivery dates are sourced from the Census Bureau. Congressional map enactment 
dates are sourced from (for all states in 2012, and all states in 2002 except Arizona) from Justin 
Levitt's website All About Redistricting (http://redistricting.lls.edu). The Arizona 2002 enactment 
date is sourced from the minutes of the November 9, 2001 commission hearing (http://az 
redistricting.org/dates/2001Meetings.asp). 1992 enactment dates are sourced from: Arizonans for Fair 
Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684 (D. Ariz. 1992), Wilson v. Eu, 823 P. 2d 545 (Cal. 1992), 
Berkman v. Roberts, No. 91-775 RE (D. Or. 1991), the effective dates of SB 92-198 (Colo. 2nd Reg. 
Sess., 1992), SB 1254 (Idaho 2nd Reg. Sess., 1992), AB 772 (Nevada Reg. Sess., 1991), and SB 25 
(New Mex. 1st Spec. Sess., 1991). Enactment dates for the Hawaii and Washington commissions are 
sourced from Lory Marie Chipps, Dividing Political Space: Commissions and the Congressional Redistricting 
Process, National Science Foundation Research Paper 9608 (1996). 
45. Note that this measure of time excludes appeals or other litigation challenging a plan once 
it is in place. In the case of successful litigation, such as the series of Wilson v. Eu judgments in 
California in the early 1990s, the enactment date is the date of the ultimate judicial decision. See 
Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992); Wilson v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1991); Wilson v. Eu, 817 
P.2d 890 (Cal. 1991). 
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days to complete a congressional map. The 2000s round was considerably shorter, 
while the 2010s round was roughly in between the 1990s and the 2000s rounds. 
In 1991, the Hawaii and Washington commissions delivered final 
congressional maps forty-six days before the average legislature in the West, and 
132 days before the average court-drawn map in that cycle. Legislatures produced 
maps faster in 2001 and 2011, but also became the less popular institution for 
drawing districts over the same period, declining from half of the western states in 
1991 to one-fifth of the states drawing congressional maps in 2011. Courts are 
consistently the slowest institution to create congressional maps, but this should 
not be too surprising, as courts only become involved in the process when a 
legislature is unable or unwilling to create a district map. As yet, a court has not 
stepped into the process to draw maps when a commission is responsible for 
creating congressional maps. 
Commissions consistently deliver district maps on time, and largely without 
litigation. In 2012, the commissions in Arizona, California, Hawaii, and 
Washington each delivered congressional maps on time. While the process in each 
of these states was marked with controversy and contention, the maps drawn by 
the commissions appear to be unchallenged and will, most likely, remain in place 
for the remainder of the decade. Granted, the first Idaho commission was unable 
to meet its strict deadline, but this commission also has structural qualities, 
discussed below, that make a supermajority vote unlikely to occur. By contrast, the 
legislatures in Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico could not pass a districting 
plan and, thus, had to engage in lengthy (on average, a court-drawn plan was put 
in place twenty-three days after the average commission-drawn plan) and costly 
legal battles to produce congressional districts in time for the 2012 primary 
elections. The Oregon and Utah legislatures were able to pass congressional maps, 
though doing so was exceptional over the last century of experience in Oregon, 
and most likely a forgone conclusion in Utah, given the unified control of the state 
by the Republicans. Taking a step back from the various criteria in place in the 
western states and instead looking at if a map was produced without involving the 
courts, it is clear that commissions accomplish this objective more often than 
legislatures. 
But there are also conditions that may foster deadlock or other problems 
within a commission. In this section we briefly discuss the experiences of the 
Arizona, California, Idaho, and Washington commissions in the 2011–2012 
redistricting cycle. Our discussion suggests two design flaws that may impede the 
ability of a commission to function effectively: absence of an independent 
member (or members), and the ability of the legislature or governor to remove a 
member (or members) of the commission. The personalities of the people 
involved may also contribute to the ability of the commissions to create district 
maps in a timely manner. 
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A. The Arizona Commission in 2011 
In Arizona all the potential candidates for commission membership come 
from a previously delimited pool, excluding present officeholders, and the 
tiebreaker in Arizona must be someone who is not affiliated with a major party. In 
a tiebreaker type of commission, such as Arizona’s, the independent chair usually 
casts the deciding vote. Because the independent member of a commission may 
be seen as siding with the minority party in the state, the potential for the removal 
of independent commissioners by a legislature (or governor) of the majority party 
can operate to challenge that independence. In the case of Arizona, the 
commission chair became in 2011 the subject of ire from the governor, who 
claimed the chair was acting in a biased manner.46 Alleging that deficiencies in the 
draft maps, the selection of the mapping consulting firm, and possible violations 
of state open-meeting laws constituted “substantial neglect of duty, gross 
misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of office,”47 the Arizona 
governor asked the state senate to concur in the removal of the chair of the 
commission. The senate did concur, but an appeal to the state supreme court 
overturned the governor’s removal of the commission chair.48 The commission 
resumed its work after the reinstatement of its chair and produced congressional 
and legislative maps in February of 2012, which were precleared by the 
Department of Justice in April of 2012. 
B. The California Commission in 2011 
The presence of “independent” members of a bipartisan or tripartite 
commission, especially if one of them is the chair,49 may facilitate interparty 
bargaining, and thus may reduce the high risk of deadlock in commissions that 
require “defection” across party lines for a plan to pass. In the 2010 redistricting 
round, the California commission was able to reach the necessary agreement of at 
least nine of its fourteen members to pass the congressional map, with approving 
votes from five out of five Democrats, three out of five Republicans, and four out 
of four independents.50 
 
46. As Bruce Cain observes, 
Tensions flared up in Arizona’s case because the majority party was not happy with the 
commission’s work. The prospect of a minority party winning the redistricting sweepstakes 
under a commission system reverses the time-honored political logic of “to the winner go 
the spoils” and tests the political majority’s tolerance for outcomes it does not favor. 
Cain, supra note 30, at 1836. 
47. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(10). 
48. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1278 (Ariz. 2012). 
49. The California commission adopted a rotating-chair system for business meetings and 
public-comment hearings. 
50. The state assembly and senate maps were approved with unanimous support from the 
Democratic and decline-to-state members of the commission, and with the support of four of the five 
Republican commissioners. See Timm Herdt, Tension Rises over Political Maps as Redistricting Commission 
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Coverage of the California process gave it extremely high marks on good-
government criteria and attributed much of that success to the fact that California 
commissioners are not appointed by partisan officials, but are instead selected 
from a pool of applicants who, though members of a political party (or, in the case 
of the decline-to-state members of the commission, identified as not a Democrat 
and not a Republican), are not beholden to partisan officials for their 
appointment. However, we would express a note of considerable caution about 
the California process. There is still an element of chance that contributed to the 
success of California’s first redistricting commission. The ability of the 
commissioners to work together and collaborate is arguably due to the 
personalities involved as much as to the structures of the commission. 
Furthermore, the commission members were not exactly a random cross section 
of the public. In addition to a number of county planning specialists, the 
commission included a former head of the U.S. Census Bureau. With the 2011–
2012 experience now one for the history books, the political parties may discover 
how to better “game” the California redistricting commission selection process, 
and it is not unlikely, in our view, that the 2020 redistricting commission in 
California may contain enough polarized partisans, that compromise on the maps 
will be stymied.51 
C. The Idaho Commission in 2011 
The Idaho commission has an even number of members, evenly divided 
along party lines.52 The voting rule used in Idaho requires four of the six 
commissioners to approve a map.53 The absence of a “neutral” chair means that at 
least one of the partisan-appointed commissioners must “defect” and vote with 
the other party’s commissioners. Although the commission held public-comment 
hearings around the state, it was unable to settle on a final map for Congress or 
for either chamber of the state legislature before the ninety-day deadline.54 A legal 
challenge to force the commission to reconvene and approve a map was turned 
aside by the state supreme court, as the court found it had no power to intervene 
in the event of no map being approved by the commission.55 On September 13, 
2011, the Idaho secretary of state called for the creation of a second commission 
to be charged with creating district maps. A second commission was put into 
 
Gives Final Approval, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Aug. 15, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.vcstar.com/ 
news/2011/aug/15/redistricting-commission-gives-final-approval-to. 
51. See Karin Mac Donald, Adventures in Redistricting: A Look at the California Redistricting 
Commission, 11 ELECTION L.J. 472, 473 (2012) (describing the factors leading to the success of 
California’s FIRST Act, California Proposition 11: Voters First Act (2008)). 
52. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1502 (2013). 
53. Id. § 72-1505(5) (2013). 
54. Id. § 72-1508 (2013). 
55. See In re Constitutionality of Idaho Legislative Reapportionment Plan of 2002, No. 39127-
2011 (Idaho 2011). 
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place and, after a truncated series of public-comment hearings and only sixteen 
days, this second commission adopted a congressional map. One Democratic 
commissioner joined the three Republican commissioners to approve the map. 
D. The Washington Commission in 2011 
Like Idaho’s commission, the Washington commission is comprised of an 
equal number of partisan-appointed commissioners.56 The nonpartisan chair is a 
nonvoting member.57 The Washington commission, however, has considerably 
more time to complete the congressional and legislative maps. Census data was 
delivered to Washington on February 23, 2011; the commission had to deliver 
congressional and legislative maps to the legislature by January 1, 2012, or else the 
state supreme court would have assumed responsibility for the maps and would 
have had to produce them by March 1, 2012.58 
After a lengthy series of public hearings (from May 17, 2011 to January 1, 
2012) the commission unanimously approved congressional and legislative maps, 
which were then approved by the legislature on February 1, 2012.59 A concerned 
citizen of Washington then challenged the maps on the grounds that they violated 
the redistricting criteria.60 This challenge to the maps was dismissed by the state 
supreme court on November 2, 2012.61 
IV. REDISTRICTING INPUT AND OUTPUT 
For each of the western states during the 2011 redistricting cycle, we first 
examine the most visible mechanism for public comment on redistricting—
namely public hearings—and then turn to data from the 1992–2012 congressional 
elections to examine three consequences of redistricting: the degree to which 
political subdivisions within the state (i.e., counties and cities) are split across two 
or more districts, the compactness of the districts, and the competitiveness of 
congressional seats. 
A. Public Comment and Redistricting 
The growth in public hearings on redistricting is part of a broader trend that 
stretches back to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and its emphasis on 
 
56. WASH. ADMIN CODE § 417-01-105 (2013). 
57. Id. 
58. WASH. SEC’Y OF ST., GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING – IN 3 PHASES, app. A at 2 (2011), 
http://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/RedistrictingGuide.pdf (last visited Feb.8, 2013). 
59. WASH. ST. REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://redistricting.wa.gov (last visited Feb. 8, 
2013). 
60. Brief of Petitioner on Interim Plan at 1, In re 2012 Wash. State Redistricting Plan, No. 
86976-6 (Wash. Mar. 1, 2012). 
61. See In re 2012 Wash. State Redistricting Plan, No. 86976-6. 
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“maximum feasible participation.”62 As Arnstein observes, “The idea of citizen 
participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle, because 
it is good for you.”63 Proponents point out that consultation with the public can 
increase the information and range of perspectives available to policymakers.64 
Public comment is also one way in which redistricting authorities can determine 
the boundaries of a community of interest.65 
Public hearings took place in each of the western states during the 
mapmaking process in 2011. Many state statutes require redistricting authorities to 
schedule a number of public meetings to gain comment, suggestions, and 
feedback from the public related to redistricting.66 Under this broad framework of 
public hearings, however, the western states exhibited diversity in the public-
involvement aspect of redistricting. For instance, the California commission, as 
well as the Oregon legislative committee and the Arizona and Washington 
commissions, held a lengthy process of hearings before creating any draft maps 
and held a second round of hearings to solicit feedback from the public on the 
draft maps. By contrast, the Idaho commission and the Utah and New Mexico 
 
62. Lillian B. Rubin, Maximum Feasible Participation: The Origins, Implications, and Present Status, 
385 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 15 (1969); see also Diane Day, Citizen Participation in the 
Planning Process: An Essentially Contested Concept?, 11 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 421, 432–33 (1997) 
(suggesting that all planners should be at least somewhat acquainted with the idea of citizen 
participation in planning). 
63. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 216, 216 
(1969). 
64. Helena Catt & Michael Murphy, What Voice for the People? Categorising Methods of Public 
Consultation, 38 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 407, 407–08 (2003). 
65. Karin Mac Donald & Bruce Cain, Community of Interest Methodology and Public Testimony, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609 (2013). Due to space limitations, we do not directly address the degree to 
which suggestions made by the public on draft or final plans at the hearings are adopted, or the 
relative impact of ordinary citizens and organized groups, or whether some types of input (whole 
plans, plans for particular districts, or suggestions about smaller units of geography) are likely to be 
influential in the process to create final district maps. These issues are discussed in detail in a 
conference paper that is still in the process of final revision. Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, 
Evaluating Public Comment into the Redistricting Process in the American States, Paper Presented at 
the International Political Science Association Madrid, 2012 XXII World Congress of Political 
Science (July 8-July 12, 2012), available at http://www.ipsa.org/myipsa/events/madrid2012/paper/ 
evaluating-public-comment-redistricting-process-american-states. 
66. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(17) (describing the requirements for redistricting); 
CAL. CONST. art. 21, § 2(b) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(6) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. §72-
1505(4) (1996) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.080(4) (2011) (same); 2011 Nev. Stat. 3761 (2011) 
(same). The Oregon redistricting statutes do not require hearings on proposed district maps, however 
the Oregon statute does require any meeting of the governing body to be open to the public. See OR. 
REV. STAT. § 192.630 (2011). The Colorado Constitution does not require the congressional 
redistricting process to include public comment hearings, but the 2011 cycle did include such 
hearings. Likewise, the rules in effect in New Mexico and Utah did not explicitly require public 
hearings, but such hearings were held in the course of the process to create congressional and 
legislative district maps. See New Mexico Legislative Redistricting, N. M. LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/redcensus (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); Redistricting Documents Online, 
REDISTRICT UTAH, http://www.redistrictutah.com/perspective/grama (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
656 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:637 
 
committees held only one round of hearings, and did not solicit feedback from the 
public on draft maps. By contrast, the first and second Idaho commissions held 
one round of comment hearings before creating district maps. The legislative 
committees in Utah and New Mexico also held one round of hearings, but 
dedicated time during hearings to discuss maps created by legislative staff or 
submitted by the public. 
 













Arizona 1 14 3 26 
California 1 25 0 10 
Colorado 4 9 3 0 
Hawaii 21 11 0 0 
Idaho 1/3 13/12 21/12 0 
Nevada 4 2 1* 1* 
New Mexico 2 9 0 0 
Oregon 5 11 4 0 
Utah 1 16 0 0 
Washington 1 18 27 3 
Notes: The first and second commission in Idaho are separated by a slash. Numbers on the 
left indicate the first commission. * indicates public comment hearings held by the special 
masters in Nevada after the governor vetoed the second redistricting bill passed by the 
legislature and the courts assumed responsibility for drawing congressional districts. 
 
The number and location of public-comment hearings in each state is 
presented in Table 3. With the exception of Nevada’s, each redistricting authority 
held initial planning meetings in the state capital, and then subsequent hearings 
around the state. Once the draft maps were complete, however, the redistricting 
authorities tended to remain in the state capital for further hearings. Only the 
commissions in Arizona, California, and Washington held field hearings after the 
draft maps were completed. 
Peter Miller directly observed hearings in nine of the western states.67 A 
typical course for one of these public hearings included an introduction by the 
redistricting authority and some remarks on the redistricting process followed by 
 
67. That author also attended a hearing in Denver of the Colorado Reapportionment 
Commission on legislative redistricting, two hearings of the Montana Districting and Apportionment 
Commission, and two public meetings of the Wyoming legislative committee in charge of legislative 
redistricting. 
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comment from members of the public. There were some variations on specific 
features of the hearings, such as the authorities asking questions of the person 
providing testimony, the length of time afforded to each person (or even if time 
limits were imposed), and the time of day for a hearing (whether in midmorning, 
afternoon, or evening). A cartographer’s observation of one hearing in the course 
of the 1990 process in New York could just as easily have been an observation of 
a hearing in the 2010 round, and gives a flavor of how these public-comment 
hearings proceeded. 
On the raised platform at the front of the room sat a half-dozen men and 
one woman, all in weekday business dress. In front of the dais, two easels 
holding large maps faced the spectators. A balding, slightly overweight 
man with a raspy voice faced the people on the platform and spoke into 
the microphone. He was upset about both the map and the state 
legislature, which had appointed the people on the dais—the people who 
had drawn the map. The young woman who testified after him was no 
less indignant. . . .  
  If this event had been a movie, we would have missed the beginning 
and much of the plot. But although a dozen people had spoken since 11 
A.M., what they said was probably no different from what we heard later: 
everyone denounced a small part of the map, some particular boundary. 
Anyone who might have been pleased with the map and its boundary 
lines kept silent or stayed home.68 
B. Integrity of Political Subdivisions 
Keeping political subdivisions of a state in the same district to the greatest 
extent feasible is one way to support a claim that the districting is based on neutral 
principles.69 Moreover, unnecessarily splitting a city or county can lead to 
confusion about district boundaries, which in turn leads to lower rates of recalling 
the incumbent’s name and higher rates of voter roll-off.70 A consistently applied 
policy of preserving city and county lines where feasible leads to greater continuity 
in the district configurations across redistricting cycles, allowing for 
representatives to develop long-term relationships with particular constituencies.71 
Furthermore, as evidenced by our observations of public-comment hearings in the 
 
68. MARK MONMONIER, DRAWING THE LINE: TALES OF MAPS AND CARTOCONTROVERSY 
190–91 (1995). 
69. Richard L. Morrill, Redistricting, Region, and Representation, 6 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 241, 251 
(1987). 
70. Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, The Participatory Effects of Redistricting, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
1006, 1006 (2009); Jonathan Winburn & Michael W. Wagner, Carving Voters Out: Redistricting’s Influence 
on Political Information, Turnout, and Voting Behavior, 63 POL. RES. Q. 373, 373 (2010). 
71. As we would expect, there is some alteration in a representative’s behavior when 
redistricting changes affect the demographic and ideological characteristics of the constituency. But 
the magnitude of this shift does not appear to be that great. Michael H. Crespin, Serving Two Masters: 
Redistricting and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 63 POL. RES. Q. 850, 855 (2010). 
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course of the 2011 redistricting cycle, slicing a city into multiple districts motivates 
members of the public from that city to voice their dislike with the existing district 
maps and to advocate keeping cities together whenever possible.72 
 
Table 4: City and County Splits in Western Congressional Redistricting Maps 
 
 Number of Split Cities (in %)  Number of Split Counties (in %) 
 1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012 
Arizona 13 13 18  38 62 38 
California 18 41 8  49 57 25 
Colorado 6 6 4  9 11 9 
Hawaii 4 2 2  20 20 20 
Idaho 1 1 1  2 2 2 
Nevada 11 16 16  7 13 7 
New Mexico 4 6 6  15 15 18 
Oregon 6 6 5  11 11 11 
Utah 1 6 6  4 11 14 
Washington 6 9 2  21 18 23 
Notes: Bold type indicates commission-drawn maps. Italic type indicates court-drawn maps. Plain text 
indicates maps drawn by the state legislature. The count of cities in each state is based on the number 
of villages, towns, and cities (as identified by the census) and excludes census-designated places, 
except in Hawaii where the only division below the county level is a census-designated place. The 
number of cities and counties in each state excludes those units larger than the ideal congressional 
district. 
 
We examine the district maps as they were drawn in 1992, 2002, and 2012, 
and count the number of cities and counties that are split among more than one 
congressional district. Table 4 shows the results.73 
 
72. A notable exception to this rule appears to be Redmond, Washington. The city itself is 
split between the first and eighth congressional districts. The mayor of the city testified at the June 13, 
2011 public comment hearing in Seattle that the residents of the city approve of being split between 
two districts. Washington State Redistricting Commission, TVW (June 13, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://www.tvw 
.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2011060012 (recording the statements of John 
Marchione, Mayor of Redmond, Washington). 
73. We used ArcGIS version 10 to identify the counties and places divided into two or more 
districts. We encountered an error with tabulating the number of split places and counties. Overlaying 
the maps of congressional districts, counties, and places resulted in a large number of slivers that are, 
as far as we can determine, artifacts of small differences in the maps we used. These slivers tended to 
be long and narrow shapes proximate to county or place boundary lines and, as a result, very small 
relative to counties or places. This error initially led to a greatly inflated count of divided counties and 
places. We sought to eliminate the slivers by sorting in order of increasing area and then manually 
deleting them from our dataset. We are indebted to Doug Johnson of the Rose Institute in 
Claremont, California (personal communication, September 2012) for pointing out that our split-
county counts for Arizona were erroneous, which led us to identify this problem. 
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Major urban centers in a state often cannot avoid being split. The Idaho 
commission in 2011, for example, managed to draw two equipopulous 
congressional districts while only splitting Ada County (the county containing the 
capital city of Boise). Similarly, the only cities split in 2011 by the Nevada 
legislature were Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson (an adjoining city 
southeast of Las Vegas proper). The Hawaii commission has consistently split 
only Honolulu County, including the city of Honolulu and its surrounding 
suburbs, to create two congressional districts with equal population. By contrast, 
cities like Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco are so large as to 
necessitate dividing the cities and their surroundings into multiple districts. 
The western states exhibit a high degree of institutional variation in 
redistricting authority since the 1990 redistricting cycle. Only Hawaii, Utah, and 
Washington have used the same institution to draw congressional districts. These 
three states also indicate a respect for political subdivisions, though the Utah 
legislature has split an increasing proportion of counties over time. Three other 
states—Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico—transitioned from legislature- to 
court-drawn district maps, with no clear trend associated with the shift in 
redistricting authority. Oregon—which transitioned in the opposite direction—
also shows no change between the 2002 and 2012 maps. The remaining 
commission states—Arizona, California, and Idaho—present a mixed set unified 
subdivisions. There is no change over time in Idaho. The Arizona commission has 
split an increasing proportion of cities, and clearly never fewer counties than the 
court-drawn map of the 1990s, despite the claims of supporters of Proposition 
106. The California commission did a better job of keeping cities and counties 
together than either the legislature or courts. In sum, we find only limited evidence 
that commissions in the western states are better than legislatures or courts in the 
region in terms of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions. 
C. District Compactness 
Compactness refers to the extent to which a district’s shape differs from the 
perfect regularity of a circle or a regular polygon such as a square. Niemi and his 
co-authors note that “we think of circles and squares as compact and long, narrow 
forms, areas with protruding arms or fingers, and ‘odd’ shapes like salamanders, as 
not compact.”74 District compactness is a very common criterion for redistricting 
authorities to wish to implement.75 
There is, however, no present-day scholarly consensus when it comes to the 
political importance of district compactness. Some scholars conclude compactness 
 
74. Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test 
for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 1158 (1990). 
75. Grofman, supra note 18, at 85; see also Levitt, supra note 7, at 25 (reporting that seventeen 
states nationwide, and seven of the western states—excluding Colorado, Nevada, and Oregon—
include compactness in the criteria for congressional districts). 
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is a safeguard against most sorts of intended foul play with district lines. “The 
diagnostic mark of the gerrymander is the noncompact district.”76 The noted 
political geographer Richard Morrill concurs: “[W]hat is suspect are extreme, 
egregious and convoluted irregularities which are not justified and probably 
cannot be. Why is extreme irregularity prima facie suspect? Why else would anyone 
go to the considerable effort?”77 Lowenstein and Steinberg, on the other hand, 
assert in no uncertain terms that “there is no basis for the assumption that oddly 
shaped districts are signs of ‘gerrymandering’ . . . [so] what basis can there be for 
the a priori assertion that the purposes of those who drew the lines were 
necessarily improper?”78 And Stephanopoulos goes even further in arguing that 
compactness may have undesired consequences.79 He asserts that too much of a 
focus on compactness tends to produce districts with a high degree of 
heterogeneity in terms of demography, socioeconomic status, and ideology, which, 
in turn—in his view—reduces participation, reduces effective representation, and 
increases polarization.80 
We do not need to take a position in this debate. Rather we will simply 
report one standard measure of compactness and then compare compactness 
scores over time and across different redistricting regimes.81 The simplest way to 
think about compactness is in terms of the irregularity of a district’s perimeter. 
One standard way to measure compactness is in terms of how large an area a 
district encompasses relative to what we would find if that perimeter were the 
perimeter of a regularly shaped figure, such as a circle. Following Polsby and 
Popper,82 we calculate compactness in the following manner: 
 
76. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural 
Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 302 (1991). 
77. Morrill, supra note 69, at 249. 
78. Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public 
Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1986). 
79. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 821–22 
(2013). 
80. Id. 
81. Non-compact districts have long tended to be highlighted in the popular media, usually in 
the context of ‘name and shame’ going back to the original ostensibly salamander-like ‘gerrymander.’ 
For example, commentators remarked that the Louisiana fourth district, as it was drawn in 1992, 
resembled the mark of Zorro. MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES: HOW 
POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 56 (2001). 
But, even when found as a criterion mandated by a state statute or even the state constitution, the 
legal status of non-compactness is hard to pin down, at least for federal courts. While non-compact 
districts have been struck down by the Supreme Court, it has always been in the context of other 
constitutional violations, such as use of race as the preponderant criterion for districting. See, e.g., Bush 
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996) (holding that strict scrutiny is used to determine the constitutional 
validity of redistricting when race is used as the criteria). And federal courts have vigorously resisted 
using non-compactness alone as sufficient evidence of partisan gerrymandering to strike down a plan 
as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
82. Polsby & Popper, supra note 76, at 348–49. 












In effect we are normalizing the area of the district relative to that of a circle 
of the same perimeter. Increasing values indicate a lower degree of contortion 
present in the district’s shape, to a maximum value of one, when the district is a 
circle.83 
 
Table 5: Average Compactness for Western Congressional Districts 
 
 1992 2002 2012 
Arizona 0.24 0.32 0.29 
California 0.28 0.18 0.22 
Colorado 0.23 0.28 0.23 
Hawaii 0.19 0.22 0.09 
Idaho 0.24 0.26 0.23 
Nevada 0.38 0.30 0.52 
New Mexico 0.32 0.35 0.33 
Oregon 0.24 0.26 0.27 
Utah 0.32 0.33 0.25 
Washington 0.23 0.23 0.19 
Notes: See text for formula used to calculate compactness. Bold type indicates commission-drawn 
maps. Italic type indicates court-drawn maps. Plain text indicates maps drawn by the state legislature. 
 
Table 5 reports the average Schwartzberg compactness for each of the 
western states over the previous three redistricting cycles. The western states 
exhibit a variety of patterns when examining district compactness. First, 
commissions can produce more compact districts than court-drawn districts, such 
as in Arizona. Commissions can also produce roughly similar levels of 
compactness to the maps drawn by legislatures, as in Idaho. The Washington 
commission has produced similar levels of compactness since 1992. The 
California commission map is marginally more compact than the 2002 map drawn 
by the legislature, but less so than the 1992 court-drawn map. The low levels of 
compactness in Hawaii are more likely due to the unique challenges of drawing 
island-based districts than to the use of a commission. 
Legislatures, to their credit, do not appear to draw wildly non-compact 
 
83. This is a variant of the Schwartzberg index. Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, 
Gerrymanders, and the Notion of ‘Compactness,’ 50 MINN. L. REV. 443, 444 (1966); see also Niemi et al., 
supra note 74, at 1155 (identifying dispersion and perimeter length as necessary components to 
compactness). 
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districts (with the exception of California in 2002), and appear to be consistent 
across cycles, as in Nevada and Utah from 1992 to 2002. By contrast, courts tend 
to draw, on average, more compact districts in rounds subsequent to legislatively 
drawn maps. 
The four cases where the same authority draws the district lines and the 
number of districts following reapportionment increases all show a marginal 
decrease in average compactness over time.84 
In short, we find no uniform relationship between the structure of the state 
redistricting authority and the average compactness of the districts drawn. 
D. Competitive Seats 
In many of the western states’ redistricting commissions, fostering 
competition is one of the factors the commission is required to pay attention to, 
though it usually plays only a secondary role. It is commonly thought that, on the 
one hand, creating competitive districts will result in more moderate members of 
Congress and, on the other hand, that state legislatures are less likely to draw 
competitive districts than commissions, as legislators tend to be risk-averse and 
would not needlessly draw districts where their party has only a slight advantage, 
unless compelled to by, say, the opposite chamber or governor's office being held 
by the other party.85 Although there is evidence from previous redistricting rounds 
in support of the second proposition,86 there is no real evidence for the 
proposition that that competitive districts produce more moderate representatives 
than representatives in safe districts.87 Relatedly, Brunell and Grofman88 and 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal,89 among others, find little or no evidence to 





84. See the 2002 round in Nevada compared to the 1992 round, and the 2012 rounds in 
Arizona, Utah, and Washington compared to the 2002 rounds in those states. See supra Table 5. 
85. Owen & Grofman, supra note 12, at 5. 
86. See, e.g., Carson & Crespin, supra note 33, at 455 (arguing that more competitive elections 
occur when courts and commissions are actively involved in the redistricting process); see also id. at 
455 (finding evidence for greater responsiveness which implies more competitiveness in districts 
drawn by courts); cf. Jonathan Winburn, Does it Matter if Legislatures or Commissions Draw the Lines?, in 
REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST, supra note 3, at 137, 145–156. 
87. James Adams et al., Why Candidate Divergence Should Be Expected to Be Just as Great (or Even 
Greater) in Competitive Seats as in Non-Competitive Ones, 145 PUB. CHOICE 417, 418–19 (2010). 
88. Thomas Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District 
Homogeneity, Political Competition, and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962-2006, in 
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 117, 118 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2008). 
89. Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666, 666 
(2009). 
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Table 6: Proportion of Competitive House Districts in the West 
 
State (Districts) 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Arizona (6) 17 0 17 33 0 
California (52) 21 15 17 10 13 
Colorado (6) 0 0 0 17 0 
Hawaii (2) 0 0 50 0 0 
Idaho (2) 0 0 50 50 0 
Nevada (2) 50 50 0 50 50 
New Mexico (3) 0 0 0 67 33 
Oregon (5) 20 40 40 20 0 
Utah (3) 33 33 33 33 0 
Washington (9) 22 67 56 33 11 
      
State (Districts) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Arizona (8) 13 0 25 13 50 
California (53) 2 2 6 9 8 
Colorado (7) 14 29 14 0 14 
Hawaii (2) 0 0 0 0 50 
Idaho (2) 0 0 50 50 50 
Nevada (3) 0 0 33 33 33 
New Mexico (3) 0 33 33 0 0 
Oregon (5) 20 20 0 0 20 
Utah (3) 33 0 0 0 33 
Washington (9) 11 11 11 11 44 
Notes: Bold type indicates commission-drawn maps. Italic type indicates court-drawn maps. Plain text 
indicates maps drawn by the state legislature. 
 
Table 6 shows the proportion of competitive seats (operationalized as seats 
won with a vote margin of ten percentage points or less) in the western states 
between 1992 and 2010. A number of patterns are apparent. Competition is fairly 
stable within states, but there are election-specific effects involving especially 
competitive or especially uncompetitive environments in some states. A natural 
basis of comparison is the within-state comparison between when a state had 
legislatively drawn districts and when it adopted a commission. The transition to a 
redistricting commission in Arizona and Idaho appears to be associated with a 
modest increase in competitive seats in Arizona, and no clear change in Idaho. 
California has been a particularly uncompetitive state since 1992, with a marked 
decrease in competitive seats after the 2000 redistricting cycle. Only one U.S. 
House seat switched parties in California between 2002 and 2010. 
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Table 7: Proportion of Competitive Seats in 2012 
 
State (Districts) 2012 
Arizona (9) 33 
California (53) 15 
Colorado (7) 14 
Hawaii (2) 50 
Idaho (2) 0 
Nevada (4) 50 
New Mexico (3) 0 
Oregon (5) 0 
Utah (4) 25 
Washington (10) 10 
Notes: Bold type indicates commission-drawn maps. Italic 
type indicates court-drawn maps. Plain text indicates maps 
drawn by the state legislature.  
 
The 2012 elections illustrate two stories about competition and redistricting. 
The first interpretation, based on the evidence from California, leads to the claim 
that the newly instituted commission succeeded in drawing more competitive 
districts than at any time since the 1996 elections, and that seven incumbents in 
California were voted out of office.90 
A second interpretation leads to a more mundane conclusion: the elections 
of 2012 were business as usual. In the western states, other than California, the 
2012 elections were unremarkable compared to past electoral cycles. The recent 
past in Arizona suggests three to four of the congressional seats will be 
competitive, and the 2012 election was within that range, even when the size of 
the delegation from Arizona increased after 2010. The other commission states 
show no change in competition. The court-drawn districts in Colorado and New 
Mexico show no increase in competition. The proportion of competitive seats 
increased from one to two in Nevada, but the size of the delegation also increased 
from three to four seats. Even in California it appears that eighty-five percent of 
the seats are solidly held by one of the parties, regardless of who draws the 
districts.91 
 
90. Drawing two or more incumbents into the same district is one way in which incumbents 
can be sure to be removed from office. However, in the 2012 redistricting cycle in the western states, 
we found only two districts in California that featured two incumbents contesting a congressional 
seat. 
91. We would also note that the evidence from previous rounds of redistricting nationwide 
suggests that the first election after reapportionment is the high-water mark of the decade in terms of 
competition, absent special circumstances such as those present in 1994. 
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Attributing an increase in competition in congressional elections solely to the 
redistricting practices disregards the use of different electoral rules that can 
directly affect electoral competition. In particular, the “top two primary”—where 
the winner and runner-up in an open-primary election, who may be members of 
the same party, compete in the general election—is used in Washington (since 
2008) and California (since 2012).92 In no case since 2008 in Washington have two 
members of the same party competed in a congressional general election. The 
2012 elections in California, by contrast, included eight such congressional races, 
two districts where Republicans competed in the general election and six races 
contested by Democrats. Five of the seven defeated incumbents were ousted by 
members of their own political party as a result of this new primary system. Thus, 
evidence from California suggests that the commission succeeded in drawing a 
larger proportion of competitive seats, but turnover in the members of the 
congressional delegation is a result of changes to the primary election system. 
Finally, we would observe great variation in the proportion of competitive 
seats in both commission and noncommission states. For example, the parity 
between Democrats and Republicans in the Oregon legislature likely contributed 
to a sweetheart deal for the incumbents there. The final congressional maps were 
passed in bipartisan votes in the state house (58–2) and in the state senate (24–6). 
None of the congressional races in 2012 in Oregon were competitive. In Utah, 
where the Republican Party firmly controls the legislature and holds the 
governor’s seat, we had limited competition for a different reason. This is an 
apparent partisan gerrymander. The congressional maps were passed by party line 
votes in the state house (50–19) and in the state senate (20–5). There was only one 
competitive congressional race in Utah in 2012, in the area around Salt Lake City 
(involving the lone Democratic representative from Utah). In Arizona, where 
advocates for redistricting reform claimed a commission would produce more 
competitive districts, we observe some supporting evidence for that claim. One-
third of the seats in 2012 were competitive, a rate which is less than the highest 
rate observed in these data (2006, when half of the seats were within ten 
percentage points), but still more competitive than all of the remaining electoral 
cycles, excluding 1998. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932 famously declared states to be laboratories, 
free to pursue social experiments that can serve as an example for other states. 
Redistricting is one such area of experimentation, with some western states opting 
to use an appointed commission rather than the state legislature to draw 
 
92. Washington Initiative 872 was approved in 2004 and became effective in 2008. WASH. 
INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 872 (2004). California Proposition 14 was approved in 2008 and became 
effective in 2012. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 5 (amended in 2009 by Proposition 14). 
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congressional and legislative districts. As we have seen, the evidence for the 
success of commissions in the western states is mixed when comparing the 
commission-drawn maps to maps created through the legislative process. But as 
we have argued, with respect to commissions, the devil is in the details. Not all 
commissions are alike. Indeed, quite the contrary; they differ in their 
organizational structures and in the criteria they pay greatest attention to. Most 
importantly, in no state is there nonpartisan line drawing in the way that line 
drawing is handled administratively (and effectively) in other first-past-the-post 
systems in English-speaking countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada.93 
There is, however, one clear area in which commissions perform above and 
beyond the noncommission states in the West: commissions deliver district maps 
on time, and largely without legal contestation. The commissions in Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, and Washington each delivered congressional maps on time. 
While the process in each of these states was marked with controversy and 
contention, the maps drawn by the commissions do not appear to be altered or 
overturned for the remainder of the decade. Granted, the first Idaho commission 
was unable to meet its strict deadline, but this commission also has structural 
qualities that make a supermajority vote unlikely to occur. By contrast, the 
legislatures in Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico could not pass a districting 
plan and, thus, had to engage in lengthy and costly legal battles to produce 
congressional districts in time for the 2012 elections. The Oregon and Utah 
legislatures were able to pass congressional maps, though doing so was exceptional 
over the last century of experience in Oregon, and most likely a forgone 
conclusion in Utah, given the unified control of the state by Republicans. Taking a 
step back from the various criteria in place in the western states and instead 
looking at if a map was produced without involving the courts, it is clear that 
commissions accomplish this objective more often than legislatures. 
The advocates who supported redistricting reform in California and Arizona 
sought to, first, eliminate the possibility of legislators colluding to produce districts 
which were created without input from the public. Commissions were thought to 
be an instrument that could open up the redistricting process. In this regard, the 
advocates are supported by the data we have collected. California and Arizona 
held a considerable number of hearings to solicit input from the public.  
When we consider other aspects of the redistricting process, however, it 
becomes harder to determine if the aims of the reformers are supported by these 
data. The California commission successfully kept more cities and counties 
together in a single district than either the courts or the legislature, but that goal 
has—thus far—proved unobtainable for the Arizona commission. We observe a 
historically high rate of competitive races in Arizona in 2012, but attributing that 
 
93. See generally HANDLEY & GROFMAN, supra note 11 (describing and comparing the voting 
rules in various countries). 
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solely to the commission is complicated by the 2002 data, which show fewer 
competitive races than the court-drawn map of 1992. The simultaneous 
introduction of a redistricting commission and the “top two primary” in California 
in 2012 frustrate any claims that the commission alone increased the number of 
competitive congressional races. 
In the United States, there have not been attempts to emulate redistricting 
practices in the United Kingdom or Canada. Instead, California94 and New 
Jersey95 have been put forward as models for best practices. We have previously 
noted our caveats about the California commission’s complex Rube Goldberg–like 
design and our fears that the requirement for agreement across partisan lines may, 
the next time around, lead to deadlock in that commission. But we would also add 
that commissions require politically skilled and highly knowledgeable leadership. 
The members of the California commission in 2011 included a past director of the 
U.S. Census Bureau, and they were mostly highly educated professionals. The 
New Jersey commissions in recent decades had the benefit of being chaired by 
leading academics, including two past deans of the Woodrow Wilson School at 
Princeton, Donald Stokes and Larry Bartels.96 The tiebreaker in 2011 in the New 
Jersey redistricting commission was Alan Rosenthal, professor of public policy at 
the Eagleton Institute at Rutgers University and a distinguished expert on the 
state’s politics who is highly respected by both parties for his public service.97 
These important caveats aside, we are sympathetic to the view that processes 
can be chosen that make “good redistricting” more likely. In particular, we share 
Cain’s view98 that a process that explicitly tries to foster the kind of back-and-
forth bargaining that seems to be the modus operandus of tiebreakers in New 
Jersey, with the independent member serving both as a facilitator of compromise 
and as an ultimate arbiter, can work well. In this context, a quote from Professor 
Rosenthal, after he finished his commission service, is informative: “I think the 
major role of the independent member . . . is to negotiate constantly and try to 
bring (the parties) closer together. And then when the time runs out, and they’re 
 
94. Kogan & Kousser, supra note 22, at 219–20; Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting 
California: An Evaluation of the Citizen Commission Final Plans, 4 CALIF. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2012); 
Supreme Court Cites IGS Research in Redistricting Decision, 53 INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUD. PUB. AFF. 
REP. 3, 3 (2012). 
95. Cain, supra note 30, at 1808; see also Donald Stokes, Is There a Better Way to Redistrict?, in 
RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 345, 364–65 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (evaluating New 
Jersey’s process for redistricting). 
96. See Eric Pace, Donald E. Stokes, 69, Leading Political Scientist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/29/nyregion/donald-e-stokes-69-leading-political-scientist.html; 
Larry E. Bartels, Curriculum Vitae , PRINCETON U. (Aug. 2011), http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/ 
vitae.pdf. 
97. Alan Rosenthal, Profile, RUTGERS EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN SCH. PLAN. & PUB. POL’Y, 
http://policy.rutgers.edu/faculty/rosenthal (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). 
98. Cain, supra note 30, at 1838. 
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as close as they’re going to come, you have to choose which one you think meets 
your criteria.”99 
In this institutional design, politics is not removed from the process, but the 
parties’ incentives to propose plans that satisfy the criteria put forward in the 
commission design and enforced by the arbiter are strong, according to the maxim 
from Federalist No. 51 “ambition is being made to counter ambition.”100 We would 
emphasize, however, that this is a model of redistricting very far from the “let 
(ordinary) citizens come together and draw a good map” that appears to be the 




99. Matt Feldman, Rutgers Professor Appointed to Redistricting Commission Downplays Newfound Power, 
NJ.COM (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/03/rutgers_professor_appointed 
_ti.html. 
100. However, in this politicized bargaining process, as the redistricting process has operated 
in New Jersey in the past, there is little role for public input. 
